Title of Paper

'Iraq and the Limits to Power'

Paper Abstract

Ten years after Washington’s decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 it is appropriate to ask three conceptually distinct yet closely interrelated questions: (a) What is the balance sheet so far as US regional and global hegemony is concerned? (b) What has been the impact of the US intervention on the incidence and intensity of terrorism? (c) What are the likely longterm consequences of the intervention for the normative and institutional underpinnings of international security? Far-reaching as the effects of the intervention have been on Iraqi society and politics, it is likely that future assessments of the intervention and its aftermath will increasingly dwell on these larger regional and global trends.

The 2-day symposium  considered the following key questions:

1. What were the key factors that led to the intervention and occupation of Iraq? What
were the goals and how can we measure their successes and/or failures?
2. What is the legacy of the intervention in Iraq? And to what extent have bi- and multilateral relations between US/UK/AUS and Iraq been shaped by the intervention,
occupation and withdrawal?
3. What are the lessons that have been learned in the last decade for the US/UK/AUS in
terms of engagement with Iraq and the broader Middle East? And what are the
examples of the most obvious failures and successes in Iraq since 2003?
4. What are the major opportunities and/or roadblocks on the path to investment,
development, peace, security and mutually beneficial relations between US/UK/AUS
and Iraq? And what are the opportunities to enhance the US/UK/AUS role in Iraq in
the short- and long-term?